sweden.htm

SWEDEN: NEUTRAL IN NAME, PARTISAN IN PRACTICE

As its southern neighbor marched into Poland on September 1, 1939, SwedenÕs Prime Minister announced to the world that his country would be dedicated to the maintenance of Òcomplete neutralityÓ[1] for the duration of World War II.  But when the dust had cleared and the Third Reich had been defeated, author Paul A. Levine declared that during WWII, ÒSweden engaged in decidedly non-neutral activities.Ó[2]  The question naturally arises, howÑ and more importantly whyÑwould Sweden assert its neutrality, only to conduct itself in a manner sufficiently non-neutral to warrant criticism from Levine and other historians?  Although Sweden has tried to defend its divergence from official and traditional neutrality with claims of unbearable pressure from the German bloc, in truth, the reasons for SwedenÕs departure from its policy were self-servingÑthe country benefited from both the declaration of neutrality and an exceptionally loose interpretation of the policy.  In order to investigate this accusation, it will first be necessary to examine the history of Swedish foreign policy, including the countryÕs early military ventures, its transition to neutrality, and the foreign policy it adopted specifically for WWII.  This will be followed by an illustration of SwedenÕs divergence from its policy during the war, and an overview of the excuses the country has made to cover its ignominious actions.  It will then be possible to examine why those excuses were, on some levels, invalid, and finally, to reveal the true motives behind SwedenÕs leniencyÑthe advantages that a pointedly casual neutral policy held for Sweden.

SwedenÕs declaration of neutrality at the beginning of WWII came as no surprise to the rest of the world, since the country had made the same declaration in every conflict since the Napoleonic Wars.  But Sweden has certainly not always been inclined toward peace and neutrality.  On the contrary, it had a long history of passionate militarism, beginning with the Vikings in the ninth century ad.  During the Heroic Age of the Vikings, an era marked by Scandinavian domination of the seas, the warriors sailed as far as Greenland, North America, Africa, and Asia.  They aggressively obtained control of the trade routes along the Dnieper River to the Black Sea and Constantinople, and along the Volga to the Caspian Sea and Eastern ports.  Swedish Vikings in particular had a strong presence in what would be Russia, controlling the Russian trade market until the late tenth century.  Their belligerent nature was also evident early on in their exploitation of the Slavs in eastern Russia, the conquest of the crucial Danish trading settlement Hedeby, and in numerous raids across western Europe.  As the glorious Viking era waned in the eleventh century, the tradition of Swedish aggression was just beginning.  By the mid-twelfth century, Sweden had been almost entirely Christianized, and King Erik the Holy decided to spread his newfound faith.  His crusade to conquer and convert Finland resulted in SwedenÕs subjugation of its neighbor, one that lasted for the next six and a half centuries.

                        Sweden was not always on the conquerorÕs end of conflict, and beginning in the thirteenth century, Denmark tried repeatedly, often successfully, to unite its crown with those of Sweden and Norway.  The ÒUnion EpochÓ of Scandinavian history finally ended in 1521, when Sweden once again bared its teeth at the rest of Europe.  Under the leadership of Gustavus Vasa, the Swedes defeated the Danes, and two years later, Vasa took the Swedish crown, founding the modern Swedish state and the tradition of absolutist monarchs in Sweden.  The countryÕs political stability, however, did not keep it out of international conflict.  In 1621, three years after the outbreak of the Thirty YearsÕ War, King Gustavus II Adolphus led the Swedish Army into what would be Poland and captured Riga.  Fighting on the side of the Protestants (by this time the Reformation had reached Sweden), Gustavus marched into Germany, and fought successful battles all the way to Munich.  Although GustavusÕ troops were ultimately forced to withdraw, the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 that ended the war included territorial gains for Sweden and brought it into the highest military standing that it would ever attain.  Swedish history was riddled with involvement in international affairs and military engagements, each more aggressive and victorious than the previous.

                        SwedenÕs last, and most important, military undertaking began when King Charles XI died in April 1697.  His son and successor, 15-year-old Charles XII, was Òa monarch whose actions shaped SwedenÕs future to the present day.Ó[3]  The young kingÕs reign was defined by his hatred for Tsar Peter the Great of Russia.  Frightened by SwedenÕs mounting military prowess, Peter had formed an alliance with Saxony, Poland, and Denmark to put an end to Swedish power, and despite CharlesÕ impressive early victories, the four countries defeated the great Swedish Army in 1709.  Charles, however, would not let his countryÕs eight-century supremacy on the international stage dissolve that easily.  After rebuilding his army, he set out to destroy Peter, a quest that ultimately ended the Swedish military presence in Europe.  At the Ukrainian town of Poltava, Charles lost almost all of his 32,000 men, and as Swedish power declined, the countryÕs enemies hastened the process by becoming even more aggressive.  Charles, the last of modern EuropeÕs monarchs to fall in battle, was shot and killed at the Battle of Freriksten in November 1718.  His legacy, as described by historian Jerrold M. Packard, was appalling: Sweden, he said, was Òreduced to penury, its military strength wasted, and the balance of power between itself and Russia permanently castÑin the latterÕs favor.Ó[4]

                        The destruction the Swedes suffered at the hand of Russia was the main reason for their dramatic switch from Òwild men Ômighty in ships and armsÕÓ to Òa people thoroughly ingrained with the values of living at peace with their neighbors.Ó[5]  Throughout the next century, Sweden continued to lose battles.  In 1809, fed up with the ravages of war, the Riksdag (parliament) compelled King Gustav IV to abdicate so it could appoint a less aggressive monarch.  The search for a king ended with the induction of Jean Baptiste Jules Bernadotte, one of Napoleon BonaparteÕs marshals.  A Roman Catholic and military general, Bernadotte was an unlikely candidate for a Protestant country hoping to settle down and stay out of war, but he was willing and ready to lead Sweden in its transition to neutrality.  In October of 1810, he arrived in Sweden as the Crown Prince Charles John.  He saw NapoleonÕs power diminishing, and with his new country as weak as it was, he knew it wouldnÕt be able to fight for a place in the new Europe.  Thus, he withdrew from international politics, and directed Òthe collective national muscle into rebuilding Swedish prosperity from its state of war-induced impoverishmentÓ[6] that had begun with the Russian wars a century before.  The countryÕs last military venture was a small clash with Norway in 1814, and the introverted, passive attitude stayed with Sweden for the next 125 years, until WWII.

                        During those 125 years, SwedenÕs culture and politics became ingrained with the idea of Ònonalignment in peace in order to ensure neutrality in war,Ó[7] the principle that is still the cornerstone of Swedish foreign policy.  Prince Charles JohnÕs reforms were continued by his successors, including his great-grandson Gustav V, the man on SwedenÕs throne when WWII began.  The idea of neutrality was also encouraged by sheer geographical luckÑSweden is bordered by Norway and Finland (partners in nonalignment), and is isolated from the rest of Europe by the Gulf of Bothnia, the Baltic Sea, and the North Sea.  Neutrality has become such an integral part of the countryÕs identity that it is hard to believe what a belligerent nation Sweden was for the majority of its history.  As one historian commented, ÒThe many decades of non-belligerence have left little taste on the part of the Swedish people for military involvement.Ó[8]  The distant memory of the days of chaos and destruction caused by war have blotted out that of Swedish greatness, to the point where neutrality has Òtraditionally enjoyed almost total support among all important segments of Swedish society.Ó[9]  The fact that the Swedish people were so intimately attached to the idea of neutrality by the outbreak of WWII became a problem when their government began to stray from the policy.

                        For at least the first few days of the war, though, SwedenÕs government was determined to stay neutral.  Prime Minister Per Albin HanssonÕs radio announcement on September 1, 1939 stated that Òa desire for complete neutrality . . . has been announced by the Government . . . No one can doubt its sincerity and the determination behind it.  The will to complete neutrality has . . . today been made public.Ó[10]  That December, Hansson even replaced Foreign Minister Rickard Sandler, who favored a more active foreign policy and had declared before the war that Òit would be . . . impossible to remain Ôabsolutely neutral,ÕÓ[11] with Christian GŸnther, a more cautious, ÒcolourlessÓ[12] man.  This action clearly indicated his desire to keep Sweden out of the war.  However, this attitude did not last long; as it turned out, Sandler was rightÑit was impossible, and undesirable, for Sweden to remain neutral.  The ÒsincerityÓ and ÒdeterminationÓ behind neutrality that Hansson had declared so vehemently would be doubted many times in the coming years, for the country quickly began to diverge from its official status.

Before one can claim that a country has strayed from a particular policy, however, the boundaries and details of that policy must be defined.  The most comprehensive interpretation of ÒneutralityÓ in its legal sense, and the main reference point for both neutrals and belligerents regarding neutrality during the war was the Hague Conventions of October 18, 1907, particularly Conventions V and XIII.  The Conventions, agreed to by Sweden when it adopted neutrality, clarified the ÒRights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on LandÓ (Hague V) and ÒNaval WarÓ (Hague XIII).[13]  Of particular significance in SwedenÕs case were Articles 2 and 5 of Convention V and Articles 6 and 9 of Convention XIII:

Convention V:

Article 2: Belligerents are forbidden to move troops or convoys of either munitions of war or supplies across the territory of a neutral Power.

Article 5: A neutral Power must not allow any of the acts referred to in Articles 2 to 4 to occur on its territory.

Convention XIII:

Article 6: The supply, in any manner, directly or indirectly, by a neutral Power to a belligerent Power, of war-ships, ammunition, or war material of any kind whatever, is forbidden.

Article 9: A neutral Power must apply impartially to the two belligerents the conditions, restrictions, or prohibitions made by it in regard to the admission into its ports, roadsteads, or territorial waters, of belligerent war-ships or of their prizes.[14]

These were the points from which Sweden strayed most egregiously, even after it had dedicated itself to a strict interpretation of the ConventionsÑso strict, in fact, that Norway complained of its neighborÕs diligent observance of international law when Sweden refused to allow the transport of material across its borders into Norway.[15]  Just three months later, Sweden signed an agreement with Germany that allowed exactly that kind of transit to occur for GermanyÕs benefit.

                        Of concessions made to Germany, ÒÔnone weighed so heavily on the minds of most Swedes, and was the object of such controversy, as the permission granted Germany to transport war materiel and members of its armed forces on Swedish railroads to and from NorwayÕ . . . permitting such activities meant a clear contravention of SwedenÕs commitment to the Hague Conventions and its position as a neutral, both in a legal and in a moral sense.Ó[16]  The transport agreements between Sweden and Germany began in April of 1940, with GermanyÕs invasion of Norway.  When the Germans encountered a severe lack of supplies coupled with successful Allied attacks on their war and supply ships, they requested SwedenÕs permission to transport material on the Swedish railway to the northern Norwegian town of Narvik.  Sweden, blatantly ignoring its previous statement that it ÒÔwould observe strict neutrality . . . and would reject German demands for the passage of troops and armaments across Swedish territory,ÕÓ[17] along with the Hague Conventions (Convention V, Art. 5) and the very spirit of neutrality, gave the Germans what they had requested.  On July 8 of the same year, the two countries came to an additional transport agreement in which Sweden allowed the transit from Norway to Germany and back of unarmed troops on leave.  One train per day was permitted in each direction between Oslo, Norway and Trelleborg, Sweden, and one train a week in each direction between Narvik and Trelleborg; each train was limited to 500 soldiers with a mandatory balance between soldiers traveling in each direction.  As if these concessions were not enough, the agreement was extended two months later to double the quota, and additional terms in favor of Germany were added yet again on December 5.[18]  The arrangement resulted in the transit of 67,000 German troops (an average of 1,400 men per day) plus 1,000 to 1,500 railway wagons with goods (largely war materiel for Germany) every month for the first sixteen months of the agreement.[19]  To make matters worse, the limits agreed upon had hardly any correlation with what was actually transported across the ÒneutralÓ nation.  Referring to the mandatory balance between troops traveling in each direction, Prime Minister Hansson announced in December 1940, ÒIn view of various rumors it ought to be stressed that . . . These transports have not increased the number of German soldiers in Norway.Ó[20]  Just two months after the speech, the number of German troops traveling to Norway exceeded those moving the opposite direction by 15,920 in a single month, and in the following month by 20,966.[21]  According to one calculation of the entire period of Swedish-German transit arrangements, the transport of a total of 2,140,000 German soldiers exceeded the quotas by 75%.[22]  The Germans were undeniably amassing troops in Norway, and Sweden was helping them do it.

                        The second wave of Swedish transport concessions to Germany occurred in 1941 during Operation Barbarossa, GermanyÕs attack on Russia through Finland.  The new arrangements were even more egregious than the first.  This time, the troops traveling across Sweden were not unarmed soldiers on leave, they were the 15,000 soldiers of the 163^rd Englebrecht Infantry Division, headed for active duty on the Russo-Finnish front.  The transit of the Englebrecht Division began on June 26, 1941, and lasted for almost two weeks, during which time Swedish soil was never free of German soldiers.  In addition to the Englebrecht Division, the flow of supplies also continued throughout Operation Barbarossa: from June 22, 1941 to the end of the year, Swedish railroads carried 100,000 mt (metric tons) of German goods from Germany and Norway to Finland, 60% of which was war materiel, plus 15,500 injured soldiers in the opposite direction.  Sweden also permitted German military aircraft to fly across its air space, and it gave German ships preferential treatment by enabling them to enter its territorial waters, a privilege denied all other foreign powers except Finland.[23]  Towards the end of 1941, when the German efforts in Finland and Russia were meeting substantial resistance, Sweden came to the rescue: it sold the Germans 700 trucks and leased them 330 more, and it supplied them with 4,000 tents with stoves from the Swedish ArmyÕs mobilization stocks (each tent sheltered twenty-five Germans).[24]  Thus, by transporting troops and war materiel for the Germans, treating their ships and planes in a partisan manner, and by aiding them with supplies, Sweden effectively violated Article 5 of Convention V and Articles 6 and 9 of Convention XIII.  In essence, the nation that had so vehemently declared Òcomplete neutralityÓ on day one of the war had learned to Òtreat its rail facilities almost as though they existed chiefly for the benefit of the Reich.Ó [25]

                        While the transport arrangements were the most obvious violation of neutrality in the legal sense, they were by no means the only instance of SwedenÕs divergence from its policy in an ideological sphere.  Some of the most significant contributions Sweden made to the German war effort and to the casual nature of its policy were in its trade with the Germans, particularly of iron ore and ball bearings.  Iron ore had always been SwedenÕs main source of income and most important industrial product, and the quality of Swedish ore was far superior to that of any of GermanyÕs other suppliers.  Thus, the iron business between Sweden and Germany was a vital part of both countriesÕ economies, and the fact that Sweden increased its supply to Germany during the war was a clear indication of SwedenÕs pro-German stanceÑit knew how much Germany needed the iron for its war effort and war economy, and it aided Germany as much as possible.  According to author Rolf Karlbom, SwedenÕs share of all German iron ore imports rose from just over 50% in the beginning of 1939 to just under 85% the following year.[26]  Swedish ball bearings played an almost equally significant roll in GermanyÕs war efforts, and they too were shipped to Germany in increasing numbers as the war progressed:

     German Imports of Swedish Iron Ore[27]         Swedish Ball Bearing Exports to Germany[28]

     ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ            ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ

     Year                                                                      Million mt                    Year     Million SEK*     % of total exports

     ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ                   ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ

     1933                                                                            2.3                          1937                         4.0                                        9.1

     1937                                                                            9.1                               1941                         25.2                                    40.3

     1943                                                                            10.1                           1943                         47.5                                    64.9

                                                                                                                                                     * Swedish krona

There is no doubt that Sweden was supplying Germany with growing quantities of materials without which, Hitler acknowledged, he would have been prevented from going to war.[29]  While ball bearings and iron ore were not strictly war materiel in the sense that their increased shipment to Germany would constitute a violation of the Hague Conventions, they were undeniably crucial supplies for Germany.  One historian even claimed that ÒÔIf the mines of Lapland [Sweden] had ceased working, the blast furnaces of the Ruhr [Germany] would have shut down too.ÕÓ[30]  By increasing the export of the ore and ball bearings to Germany, then, Sweden irrefutably aided the Nazi war machine, violating the very fundamental concept of wartime neutrality.

                        SwedenÕs partisanship toward Germany did not end with trade and transit of troops and material.  Within Sweden, the government enforced a pro-German attitude through press censorship and careful control of the entertainment industry.  For instance, during GermanyÕs conquest of Norway, the Norwegian point of view was often suppressed in Swedish newscasts and publications.  In May 1940, Sweden denied the Norwegian President of the Parliament, Carl J. Hambro, access to the Swedish Broadcasting System, and cancelled his scheduled lecture in Stockholm, SwedenÕs capital.  In the same month, Tidningarnas TelegrambyŒ, the primary Swedish news agency, refused to publish an official protest by Norway about the German bombardment of Norwegian hospital ships, and eight days later withheld reports of the German bombings of the Norwegian cities Molde and Kritiansund.  Sweden went so far that some claimed Òneutral Sweden had been more severe in its press censorship than the German authorities in Norway.Ó[31]  The newspapers Dagens Edo, Den svenske Folksocialisten, Bildtidningen, Ny Dag, and Norrskensflamman were all confiscated by the government for describing ignominious German behavior, and in the most severe incident of press censorship, the government suppressed 18 newspapers in a single day for printing articles about German atrocities committed in Norwegian prisons.  One journalist, Ture Nerman, was even imprisoned for three months for criticizing SwedenÕs non-neutral behavior.[32]  The Swedish government was undeniably attempting to shift the public attitude in favor of the Germans by censoring the press.  This social aspect of SwedenÕs questionable neutrality extended beyond the arena of journalism as well.  Radio, theater, and film were all watched carefully for anything that might be Òslanted against the Reich.Ó[33]  The stage actor Karl-Gerhard was forced by the Swedish police to close his play That Notorious Trojan Horse the night after it opened on accusations of anti-German content.  As testimony to the severity of the censorship, Swedish author Joachim Joesten wrote after the Karl-Gerhard incident that his nation had fallen Òto the level of a Nazi province.Ó[34]

                        Because of SwedenÕs blatant failure to follow through with its traditional and declared neutrality, the country came under sustained criticism, especially from the Norwegians and the Allies.  Norwegian and British sources referred to SwedenÕs activities as a ÒÔflagrant breech of . . . neutrality,ÕÓ ÒÔdirect assistanceÕÓ of Germany,[35] and Òa policy of shame and ignominy.Ó[36]  The anti-Swedish sentiment eventually grew so severe that Sweden was forced to answer for its actions, and the main defense it used was that it had been threatened into straying from its policy by intense pressure from the German bloc.  Regarding concessions to Germany, the government claimed that it Ònever made them willingly but declared them necessary in order to forestall invasion and occupation.Ó[37]  Indeed, the Germans were fairly relentless in pressuring Sweden for concessions.  For instance, on May 6, 1940, Nazi leader Hermann Gšring, in a conversation with his Swedish contact, Birger Dahlerus, ÒThreateningly . . . more than hinted at the possibility of a German attackÓ if Sweden did not agree to further transit agreements than had already been made.  Dahlerus said that Gšring had made it clear Òhow meaningless it would be to attempt to defend [Sweden] in the event of the Germans wishing to occupy it.Ó[38]  Just a few days after GšringÕs threat, two other Nazi officials, Joachim von Ribbentrop and Ernst von WeizŠcker, held consecutive discussions with the Swedish minister in Berlin, Arvid Richert, which included more pressure for concessions.[39]  Following GermanyÕs success in Norway, German General Wilhelm Keitel told Ribbentrop to Òenter negotiations with Sweden for the purpose of achieving unhindered transit traffic for all kinds of transport,Ó and it was as a consequence of these negotiations that Sweden entered into its second transit agreement with Germany.[40] 

                        While the Gšring and Ribbentrop cases were the most direct pressure Sweden endured from Germany, it also felt the ever-present possibility of a German attack on its precious soil.  When Germany invaded Norway and Denmark, SwedenÕs neighbors to the west and south, its traditional buffer zones vanished.  Also, by the time WWII began, many of the geographical advantages that Sweden had cherished previously had been compromised by the invention of long-range bombers, modern warships, and other technological advances.  Besides the sheer proximity of the Third Reich, Sweden heard ÒVarious comments made by Nazi officials during the war [that showed] very clearly that a total subordination of Sweden to the Third ReichÕs ÔNew OrderÕ was considered.Ó[41]  Sweden also heard rumors that Heinrich HimmlerÕs plan for the Greater Franconian-Germanic Reich included the incorporation of southern and central Sweden into Germany, and that part of one plan for the Gro§wirtschaftsraum (Greater Economic Space) was German domination of Sweden.[42]  The final layer of pressure that caused Sweden to try to appease Germany at every opportunity (or at least the pressure they claimed caused them to do such) was the fact that ÒHitler virulently despise[d] the concept of neutrality.Ó[43]  Sweden had ample reason to be frightened that a German invasion could be right around the corner.

                        German pressure was the main defense Sweden gave in the explanation of its divergence from neutrality, but it was not the only one.  The Swedes also tried to justify their actions with the claim that they were of little consequence to the overall course of the war.  When ÒConfronted about the export of ball bearings, the sole Swedish producer . . . told the British Foreign Office that they were not vital to the German armaments industry,Ó[44] a decidedly false statement, since Hitler himself admitted the importance of Swedish materials to his war effort.  Before the passage of the Englebrecht Division through Sweden, the government claimed that the transit of German troops on leave was perfectly compatible with neutrality since it was of Ònegligible relevance to the course of the war.Ó[45]  But that argument presumed that equal numbers of troops were going to Norway as were coming from it, an entirely false assumption.  Thus, denial of its effects on the war was not an adequate defense for SwedenÕs betrayal of neutrality.

                        Yet another defense the Swedes tried to use was their extensive humanitarian aide, particularly in helping to save thousands of Jews during the Holocaust.  Beginning in Norway and continuing in Germany, France, Denmark, and Romania, Swedish diplomats conducted a kind of Òbureaucratic resistanceÓ[46] to the Holocaust.  They would first request of the Germans that all Swedish Jews in a particular country be permitted to return to their homeland.  Then, they would attempt to aid non-Swedish Jews by trying to make them more ÒSwedishÓÑthey naturalized them, gave them official documents from the Swedish government, or gave their names to the German government to be placed on an exemptive listÑin an attempt to save as many Jews as possible from the Nazis.  The fact that the Swedish Utrikesdepartementet (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) saved countless Jews from persecution was pointed out by the Swedish government when it came under sharp criticismsÑhow could Sweden be pro-Germany when it gave aid to the same Jews that the Germans were attacking?

                        However, like the denial of the effects of Swedish partisanship on the war, the countryÕs humanitarian actions cannot be used as sufficient defense of their ignoble behavior.  The first reason is that the aid itself was an abandonment of neutrality: Òthere can be no question that by deciding to save some Jews, Sweden engaged in decidedly non-neutral activities in a matter of the highest ideological priority for Germany.Ó[47]  Since the NazisÕ racial policy against Jews was at the heart of their conduct throughout the war, SwedenÕs aid to the Jews was an attack on the Nazi war effortÑa partisan movement.  Thus, had the assistance of the Jews not been such an admirable undertaking, it too might have been criticized as a divergence from neutrality.  The second reason the aid to the Jews cannot excuse Sweden is that while there were likely some purely moral motives behind the humanitarianism, ÒThere is no question that important members of SwedenÕs leadership understood that helping others was good politicsÓ[48]ÑSweden looked bad, and needed something to save its reputation in international eyes.  ÒThere indeed have been few cases in international history when humanitarian actions supersede the hard realities of national self-interest.  There is therefore little reason to argue that Sweden helped Jews during the war solely, or even mostly, for ÔpurelyÕ humanitarian reasons.  Sweden helped non-Swedish Jews because it was, or became, good for Sweden.Ó[49]  SwedenÕs aid to the Jews, then, cannot be taken at face value.  The reason the government felt it necessary to aid the Jews was to cover up what it had done in favor of the Germans. 

As testimony to this argument, several of the Utrikesdepartementet members who were most prominent in the organization of the Jewish aid were anti-semites, emphasizing the idea that the aid had no ideological motives, but was instead purely for SwedenÕs  benefit.  Minister of Justice and temporary Foreign Minister K.G. Westman, for example, attributed mistakes made by Erik Boheman, another Swedish government official, to his partial Jewish background.  He also dismissed journalist Torgny SegerstedtÕs criticism of the government by citing ÒHis [SegerstedtÕs] Jewish mistress, . . . [who] has removed his soul and replaced it with a Jewish one.Ó[50]  Gštsta Engzell, another official of the Utrikesdepartementet, referred repeatedly to Òthe problemÓ of EuropeÕs Jewish population.[51]  Westman and Gšsta were by no means the only members of the Swedish government who held such sentiments.  Before the war, the government had even designed immigration policies to keep Jews out, and in 1930, while Sweden was home to 2,000 Jewish refugees, the Netherlands and Belgium, nations of comparable size, had 30,000 and 15,000, respectively.[52]  Thus, the Swedish governmentÕs use of its humanitarian actions to defend its betrayal of neutrality was insufficient and even dishonorable.

                        Therefore, the only viable defense Sweden had left to stave off complete disgrace was the pressure from the German bloc.  This too, however, while certainly very present in the SwedesÕ eyes, was not sufficient justification for their actions.  One reason for the invalidity of the claims is that Sweden was assured repeatedly of its safety.  At the commencement of the German invasion of Norway, German official Prince von Wied promised the Swedish government that its country would in no way suffer harm of any sort from the campaign.[53]  German diplomats sent repeated guarantees of security to SwedenÕs government, including a letter from Hitler himself to King Gustav V on April 25, 1940.  Again, on March 16, 1942, Hitler assured the King directly that SwedenÕs neutrality would not be violated, and yet, even after such assurances, transit traffic and other concessions to Germany continued.[54]  In addition to these promises from the Germans, Sweden should have taken comfort in the fact that it was not part of HitlerÕs expansionist plans (in Mein Kampf and the ÒSecond BookÓ)[55] in the years before the war; nor was it included in the plans for the occupation of Norway and Denmark, one of the events that scared it the most.  Finally, Sweden was perfectly aware of how valuable its raw materials were to Germany, and so it must have known that Germany would not readily risk destroying those commodities with a bombardment of the state. 

                        SwedenÕs claims of German pressure were also weakened by the fact that the concessions went on far too long and too extensively for pressure to be the real motive behind them.  ÒThe appeasement and concessions ended in fact only after severe Allied pressure.  Actually, few of the advantages given over the years to the Germans were withdrawn without Allied political pressure.Ó[56]  This pressure included threats of possible post-war difficulties for Sweden.  As Winston Churchill wrote, ÒIt is right to put pressure on Sweden to sharpen her attitude to Germany.  Neutrals who have played a selfish part throughout ought to be made to suffer in the postwar world.Ó[57]  Even after Sweden and Britain made an agreement in which Sweden promised to slow iron ore shipments to Germany in exchange for increased oil shipments from Britain, Òthe Third Reich continued to enjoy the benefits of discreet Swedish commercial compliance.Ó[58]  And long after it was clear that Germany was going to lose the warÑÒby early 1943, most Swedes, even those still fearful of [HitlerÕs] potential wrath, understood that Germany was going to lose the war and that his ability to threaten Sweden had virtually disappearedÓ[59]Ñthe concessions continued.  As one historian put it, ÒSwedish officials . . . defended their countr[yÕs] trade with the Nazis as an essential means of survival.  This line of defense rings particularly hollow if one considers that the volume of trade continued at a substantial level, indeed increased at a time when GermanyÕs military position was rapidly deteriorating.Ó[60]  Even when the Swedes received assurances of their safety and severe Allied pressure to return to their neutrality policy, and even after the German threat had disintegrated, the Swedes continued to lean towards the Germans and to aid their war effort.  Thus, no feasible excuses exist for SwedenÕs abandonment of its neutrality.

The question still remains, then, if not because of pressure from the Germans, why did Sweden desert its neutrality?  The answer is that both the title of neutrality and the reality of a decidedly non-neutral policy were beneficial to SwedenÑthe countryÕs actions in WWII were self-serving.  The reason the title of Òneutral nationÓ appealed so to Sweden as it watched the potentially severe and destructive nature of the war increase was the fact that if it were officially neutral, it would not have to experience that destructionÑthe Hague Conventions provide protections for neutral nations.  A declaration of neutrality is a simple way of preserving oneÕs basic infrastructure and comforts, not to mention population, an idea that was especially appealing to a country that had been ripped apart by war two centuries before: ÒÔNeutrality . . . gained a special glamour in Swedish eyes; a guarantee of escaping the havoc of world war.ÕÓ[61]  So while other nations were utterly demolished, Sweden emerged from the war unscathedÑbecause it was officially Òneutral,Ó other countries left it alone.  Had it not declared neutrality, Sweden would have been called upon to take a more active, and possibly dangerous role in the war; the neutrality policy allowed it to avoid such dangers.  Another way in which Sweden benefited from the title of neutrality was regarding its international standing.  By continuing its tradition of Òneutrality,Ó the country obtained the prestigious and critical position of a nation of mediators, peacekeepers, and skilled diplomats.  Just three years after the United Nations was founded, Swede Folke Benadotte became the first UN mediator, and was assigned to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict of 1948.  Other Swedes followed in his footsteps: Gunnar Jarring was a UN mediator for the Middle East from 1967 to 1991, and Olof Palme arbitrated the Iraq-Iran conflict of the 1980s.  Even during WWII, Swedish mediation was partially responsible for the success of a treaty between Finland and the Soviet Union in March, 1940.[62]  Thus, the declaration of neutrality was motivated by the fact that it was clearly appealing and beneficial to Sweden.

Once it had put a protective shield around itself with the title of neutrality, Sweden abandoned the policy, most notably in terms of economic and material concessions.  The main reason Sweden maintained trade and material contact with Germany was that this contact benefited its own wartime financial situationÑSweden did not want to lose money, and by shifting its trade and transport policies in favor of the Germans, it received enticing benefits from them that allowed it to protect its own economy.  When, as part of the invasion of Norway, German ships and air patrols blockaded the Skagerrak Strait, Sweden was cut off from the North Sea, its Western markets, and 70% of its energy supply.[63]  But as Sweden gave Germany more iron and ball bearings, Germany supplied Sweden with exactly what it needed to keep its economy healthy: from 8.5% of SwedenÕs total imports from Germany between 1936 and 1938, coal and coke supplies increased to an average of 26.5% between 1940 and 1943.[64]  GermanyÕs total exports to Sweden also increased significantly, clearly indicating that Sweden was benefiting from the trade with the Third Reich:

Total German Exports to Sweden[65]

ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ

Year                                                        Million SEK

ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ

1938                                                               454

1939                                                               620

1940                                                               769

1941                                                               870

1942                                                               808

1943                                                               894

In 1943, the German exports to Sweden constituted a full 50% of total Swedish imports.  Sweden also began to receive ÒGermanÓ gold (in truth the Swedes knew that it had either been obtained from the banks of occupied countries or stolen from the Jews) as payment for the increased iron ore shipments in 1943.[66]  SwedenÕs economy was benefiting substantially from keeping the Germans satisfied, and Òprofit considerations had long overridden or numbed moral concerns.Ó[67]  The press censorship that the government initiated in favor of the Germans was aimed at both pleasing the Third Reich and at pacifying disgruntled members of the Swedish populationÑin order to allow trade to proceed.  The transit agreements had a similar purposeÑto keep the Nazis pleased so the benefits for the Swedish economy would continue.  SwedenÕs abandonment of neutrality, then, was driven by the benefits that it held for the countryÕs economy.

When WWII broke out in Europe, Sweden declared itself an officially neutral nation.  To the rest of the world ÒneutralÓ meant that Sweden would stay out of the war and remain completely nonpartisan to all sides of the conflict.  To Sweden, ÒneutralÓ meant something entirely different.  It meant that the country would carry on an extensive arrangement of transport and supply of troops, war materiel, and metals crucial to the German war effort.  It meant that even after the threat of a German invasion was gone, it would continue to aid the Germans in their fight against the Allies.  And it meant that when the rest of Europe was facing years of rebuilding after the war, Sweden would have both an untouched landmass and a sound economyÑthe first a result of the title of neutrality, the second a result of a decidedly non-neutral policy.  As much as Sweden wanted to stay neutral when WWII began, Antonio de Oliveira SalazarÕs conclusion ultimately proved correct: ÒThe desire for neutrality cannot be superior to the interest of the nation.Ó[68]  SwedenÕs interest in economic security during World War II triumphed over its 125-year tradition of neutrality.